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INTRODUCTION

Former Solicitor General Charles Fried advises that writers on
legal topics in which they have personal interest are well advised to
begin with a statement of interest alerting the audience to any possible influence on the presenter's viewpoint. As a federal judge
presenting the topic of civil RICO, I have to advise that the statement of interest will exceed anything else I have to say. While my
own viewpoint may be unusually skewed in a particular direction,
the federal judiciary generally, if not universally, inclines in the
same direction. The Chief Justice of the United States may well
have been speaking for all of us in an piece he wrote for The Wall
Street Journal.' The title of that piece may say it all: "Get RICO
Cases Out of My Courtroom." 2 Other justices have expressed similar sentiments in more formal writing, specifically opinions, especially separate opinions. While I will make some reference to these
in the text below, I offer two as illustrations of the depth and
universality of the judicial distaste for civil RICO proceedings. In
his dissent from Sedima v. Imrex,3 Justice Marshall wrote that the
1. The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1989, at A-14, col. 4.
2. Id.
3. Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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civil RICO statute, as interpreted by the majority in Sedima, "validates the federalization of broad areas of state common law of
frauds, and it approves the displacement of well-established federal remedial provisions."" Marshall was joined in this dissent by
5
Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Powell.
More recently in his concurrence in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,' Justice Scalia quoted with approval the above
language from Marshall's Sedima dissent and added the concern
that "RICO, since it has criminal applications as well, must even in
its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for
criminal laws." 7 Perhaps most tellingly, he noted that "no constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case...
That the highest court in the land has been unable to derive from
this statute anything more than . . . meager guidance bodes ill for
the day when that challenge is presented."8 Justice Scalia wrote for
himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. By
adding up the joiners in the two separate opinions, you may observe that seven present and one former Supreme Court Justice,
crossing the Court's entire judicial spectrum, have joined in decidedly negative expressions of the judicial perspective on civil RICO.
As you may note, this includes every member of the present Supreme Court except Justices White and Stevens. You might also
note that Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens and three others
in the majority opinion in Sedima entered a less than ringing endorsement of the evolution of civil RICO practice. Their majority
opinion recognizes that "RICO is evolving into something quite
different than the original conception of its enactors," and expresses a sharing of "the doubts of the Court of Appeals about this
increasing divergence." 9
In the text of my further treatment on judicial perspective, I
will endeavor to give you some of the reasons underlying this
widely, if not unanimously held, disdain.
4. Id. at 501.
5. Id.

6. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
7. Id. at 2909 (citing FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 296
(1954)).
8. Id.
9. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

II.
A.

[Vol. 12:145

THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE

The "Mass" of Civil RICO
1.

In General

The foundation stone underlying the judicial distaste for the
RICO problem is its sheer mass. I choose the word "mass" advisedly, because I do not refer to sheer volume. Volume per se is indeed a problem. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in The Wall
Street Journal, "civil filings under the Racketeer-Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations law have increased more than eight-fold
over the past five years to nearly a thousand cases during 1988. "11
Professor Gerard Lynch of Columbia University Law School, relying in part on the Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of
the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,1" reports a compilation of civil RICO filings revealing that between the
effective date of the Act, October 15, 1970, and the end of the decade of the 70's, the number of civil RICO filings was statistically
insignificant. 2 In 1984, there were approximately 100 filings; in
1986, over 400; and approximately 1000 in each succeeding year. 3
There is no doubt that the volume alone, adding to the clutter of
already loaded dockets, contributes to the general negative judicial
attitude on the subject.
However, volume is neither the beginning nor the end of the
"mass" problem. There are many other statutes that contribute
large numbers of civil cases. But while you may find individual
judges who grumble about Title VIls or FOIA actions, no other
type of action that I know of has generated anything parallelling
the reaction to RICO. To underline what has been said by the Supreme Court justices quoted above, every single district judge with
whom I have discussed the subject (and I'm talking in the dozens
of district judges from across the country) echoes the entreaty expressed in the Chief Justice's title in The Wall Street Journal.
What I'm talking about under the heading of "mass" is not simply
the size of the RICO monster, but its amorphous and seemingly
boundless character. This obviously raises the necessity for some
brief explanation of what RICO is and what it is that RICO liti10. The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1989, at A-14, col. 4.
11. See generally, Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 920 (1987).

12. Id.
13. Id.
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gants are doing in our federal courts.
It should be obvious from the above quotation of justices that
the judiciary does not perceive RICO to be what Congress envisioned, or at least to be doing, what Congress meant it to accomplish. You may have heard it said that Congress in enacting the
RICO statute intended to "get the Mafia." That's not quite the
case. Congress no doubt intended to "get the Mafia" when it enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), 1 4. of which
RICO was a part (Title IX); but its specific purpose in enacting the
RICO title requires a slightly longer sentence than "Congress was
trying to get the Mafia." In enacting RICO, Congress was trying to
get the Mafia out of legitimate business. 15
In 1970, Congress, as it no doubt should have, asked: "What
does organized crime do?" The answer was simple: "Whatever has
a buck in it." Since organized crime was doing whatever had a
buck in it, it had invested the proceeds of its drug sales, prostitution, illegal gambling, extortion, and other criminal undertakings
into profit-making enterprises, which were not in themselves illegal
or even undesirable. The lords of lawlessness owned or controlled
significant segments of such varied enterprises as motel chains,
garbage collection businesses, and labor unions. These profit-makers and dues producers were cycling funds back to the true robber
barons so that they could expand their illegal activities and further
extend their tentacles into the law-abiding sector. This was not a
good situation and certainly a threat to interstate commerce.
Congress took the task of empowering the Executive and the
courts to deal with this problem through the enactment of the
Rackeeter Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act."6 Along with
those empowering provisions was another which drew relatively little attention at the time of enactment, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, which
provided civil remedies for nongovernmental plaintiffs. The principal remedy, springing from 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), provides that "any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 . . .may sue. . . in any appropriate United States
District Court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'"
14.
15.
L. REV.
16.
17.

Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
See generally, Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM.
920, 972-73 (1987).
18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
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The malady that Congress perceived was real. Undoubtedly,
Congress acted from the most beneficent of motives in attempting
to arm persons injured by the mob with weapons to fight back, and
remedies to make their injuries well. The "mass" problem arises
from the fact that the remedy is not a specific for the illness in the
body politic, nor is the weapon being used by plaintiffs against the
enemy Congress perceived.
By 1985, the Supreme Court recognized that the ABA Task
Force had found that of the "known civil RICO cases at the trial
court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37%, common law fraud
in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of
criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional
criminals.' """ An American institute of certified public accountants study of 132 published decisions "found that 57 involved securities transactions and 38 commercial and contract disputes,
while no other category made it into double figures."' 19 Or, as Justice White put it for the majority of the Court, "it is true that
private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost
solely against [legitimate] defendants rather than against the archetypal intimidating mobster.""0
2.

The Statutory Overview

To understand how a weapon Congress envisioned as a rifle to
shoot at mobsters became a shotgun pointed at everybody requires
an analysis of the RICO statute itself, and the elements it makes
sufficient to support a civil cause of action. 28 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
provides that
any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 2
This obviously provided the federal courts with jurisdiction over
anything which constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
Section 1962 has four subsections, (a) through (d). Subsection
18. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499, n.16 (citing the ABA task force, supra).
19. Id. (citing American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The Authority to Bring Private Treble Damage Suits under "RICO" Should Be Removed
13 (October 10, 1984)).
20. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss2/1
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(d) simply makes it "unlawful for any person (sic) to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of [section 1962]. ''22 Each of the other three subsections provides material for the unchecked flow of the amorphous RICO mass into
every corner of federal court. Subsection (a) makes it
unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of any unlawful debt . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activi23
ties of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
That subsection contains certain limitations which at least appear
so far to dam the flow of RICO away from open-market purchases
of less than control-size traded securities.
Subsection (b) makes it "unlawful for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. "24
Finally, subsection (c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec'2 5
tion of unlawful debt."
Simply reading the statutory language of the three subsections
without further analysis by itself, raises judicial hackles as to the
breadth and generality of RICO's coverage. But to fully understand the deviltry created by this amorphous mass in practice, we
must look to separate elements. Subsection (c) is the subsection
most used and the one most troublesome. I will focus on that subsection, but remember that troublesome elements, particularly the
"pattern" requirement pervade all the subsections. The statute
raises at least four critical questions: What is a "pattern"?; What is
"racketeering activity?"; What is "participate in the conduct of affairs?"; and What is an "enterprise?". We will consider these in
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).

23. Id. at § 1962(a).
24. Id. at § 1962(b).
25. Id. at § 1962(c).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
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reverse order.
3.

6

2
The Elements

a. What is an "Enterprise"?
28 U.S.C. § 1961, the definitional section of RICO, states:
" 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."2 In other words,
an enterprise is one or more persons doing nearly anything in any
form. This might be as good a time as any to remind you of the
origin of the word "enterprise." That word comes from the latin by
way of middle french and derives from enter, meaning to come
within and pendre, meaning to seize or take. In the context of
RICO, "enterprise" has rushed in and seized everything.
Do note that there is one limiting principle: the enterprise
must be distinct from the RICO defendant. (More on that under
notes on practice.) Aside from that one limiting principle, the concept of RICO enterprise is almost limitless. Courts have obviously
held corporations to be enterprises. 8 Equally obviously courts
have held unions to be enterprises.2 9 The courts have also found

sufficient: a lengthy association between two defendants who on a
number of occasions sought to introduce a federal agent and an
informant to sources of narcotics;3" a circle of bribed race horse
jockeys who were joined through defendant with a circle of informed bettors who profited from the illegal fixing of races;3 l a
group of individuals associated in fact;32 parties involved in the
26. Though the topic of this paper is civil RICO, some of the examples are
drawn from criminal cases. This does not detract from the accuracy or the applicability of the quoted or extracted holdings, since all definitions apply to section
1964 civil RICO as well as the various criminal RICO sections.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
28. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), on reh'g, 710
F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 729 F.2d 1468 (1984).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 921 (1977).
30. United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
993, 1014 (1982).
31. United States v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 911 (1981).
32. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 671 F.2d
1379, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss2/1
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sale of two lots in a subdivision, claiming joint ownership;3 3 the

office of a South Carolina State Senator; 34 a county sheriff's department;"6 a city police department;36 various state and local tax
bureaus; 37 the county prosecutor's office; 8 and various courts; 39
and perhaps most surprisingly, a sole proprietorship has been held
to be an "enterprise" with which its proprietor can be "associated"
within the meaning of RICO.40 This list of concepts included
within the term "enterprise" is offered only by way of example,
and not exhaustion-except possibly the exhaustion of judicial patience and probably of your attention span.
Thus, on the subject of "mass," the concept of "enterprise"
has it. It is massive. It is huge, heavy, and without definite form.
b.

What is "Participatein the Conduct of Affairs"?

Now that we know precisely what an enterprise is, what does
the statute require so far as participating in the conduct of affairs?
While the statutory definition of enterprise gave little guidance as
to the element of association with the enterprise, the statute provides no definition at all of this concept. Therefore, we must look
to the case law for the delineation of this element. As with everything else about RICO, there is no solid agreement as to the proper
answer to the instant question. The best I can give you is a rough
mix of formulations and holdings as to whether or not particular
33. J.G. Williams, Inc. v. Regency Properties, Ltd., 672 F. Supp. 1436 (N.D.
Ga. 1987).
34. United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896
(1981); but see, United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.) (holding that
the office of Governor of Tennessee is not an "enterprise"), cert. denied sub nom.,
Sisk v. United States, 459 United States 1072 (1982).
35. United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980); See also United
States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1983).
36. United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972
(1982).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 683 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1173 (1983); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
38. United States v. Altomar, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980).
39. United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1985) (county circuit
court in Illinois), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985); United States v. Angelilli,
660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 945 (1982) (N.Y. City Civil
Court); United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979) (Philadelphia Traffic Court).
40. McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
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connections constitute the requisite participation in the conduct of
affairs of the enterprise. United States v. Field"1 teaches that "no
particular degree of interrelationship is required.' 2 Some courts
have required that the defendant participate in the "direction" or
"management" of the enterprise,"3 or that the predicate acts be
"helpful or necessary" to the operation of the enterprise." The
Fourth Circuit requires that the enterprise have "its affairs advanced or benefited in some fashion, direct or indirect, by the pattern of racketeering activity."' 5
The Fourth Circuit's formulation may not sound particularly
cabining but the Fifth Circuit finds it to be "unduly restrictive.' 6
That circuit would require only "a relation between the predicate
crime and the affairs of the enterprise.' 47 My own circuit (D.C.
Circuit), has adopted the same approach as the Fifth Circuit in
Yellow Bus Lines v. Local Union 639.48 Again, in order to completely comply with Solicitor General Fried's advise, I offer a further "statement of interest." When the order was entered denying
an en banc review of the Yellow Bus Lines case, a footnote thereto
revealed that I dissented from that denial of en banc review along
with my then colleague, now Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr.
To give you some flavor of what is sufficient under the more
open-ended of these tests,' 9 the Third Circuit found that a magistrate who accepts bribes from a bonding company is sufficiently
"associated with" the bonding company enterprises' affairs. 5 0
United States v. Bright 51 found that bribing and influencing a
sheriff qualified as participation in2 the conduct of the sheriff's office, the "enterprise" in that case.1
41. 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
42. Id. at 58.
43. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co.,
782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986), Bennett v. Berg, 710 F 2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.
1983), cert denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
44. United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
45. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 1981).
46. United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied,
663 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
47. Id. at 1061.
48. 839 F.2d 782, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
49. United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. Id.
51. 630 F.2d 804, 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Id.; See also United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1320-21
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol12/iss2/1
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In sum, the most I can tell you about this element is that, at
least in my circuit, though not in yours, if you do something that
in some fashion effects something that the enterprise is doing, you
may be participating in the conduct of its affairs.
c.

What is Racketeering?

If the definition of "enterprise" was broad in its brevity, the
definition of "racketeering activity" in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 is virtually
boundless in its specificity. 3 The statutory definition reads as
follows:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224
(relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section
664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds),
sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection
with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of
gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to
obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1511 relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness,
victim, or any informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981)(businessman paying kickbacks to
sheriff in exchange for contract held to participate in sheriff's office affairs);
United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 137-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1020 (1985)(allowing section 1962(c) RICO charge against a police officer charged
with soliciting bribes to influence disposition of the case in the county court-the
enterprise); United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 131, 137-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1055 (1985)(reversing dismissal of a RICO count against a defense attorney charged with participation in the affairs of the State Attorney's Office by attempted bribery). In Yellow Bus, my own circuit held that a union striking a
company was participation in the conduct of the company's affairs. Yellow Bus,
839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
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against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1951 (relating
to interference with commerce, robber, or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating
to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating
to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating
to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire),
sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children),
sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections
2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D)
any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11,
fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
any law of the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable
under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act[.]"
I will not attempt a point-by-point analysis of the definition. I
will merely suggest that it is difficult to imagine how any act of
Congress could be both as niggling in its specificity and as totally
encompassing in its scope as this definition. We are all familiar
with the maxim of statutory construction "inclusio uno exclusio alter."55 In this case, Congress has obviated its possible use by leaving almost nothing conceivably excluded.
To understand fully the impact of that broad definition of
racketeering, it must be understood that in order to bring a civil
RICO action, it is not necessary that a plaintiff allege that the defendant has been convicted or even indicted, or for that matter,
criminally investigated or suspected of the nefarious activities set
forth in the definition of racketeering; only that he, she, or it has
committed such an act." The plaintiff knows, of course, that he,
she, or it will never have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1982).
55. Denhurst v. Feilden, 7 Man & G 182 at 186 (1845).
56. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500.
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the defendant has committed any such act. A civil burden of proof
would apply." Indeed, in order to make the allegation and have
the desired effect, the allegation need not meet even that burden,
but only the liberal standards of Rule 12(b)(6) that the allegations
of the complaint state a claim for relief. 8 In fact, to achieve the
genuinely desired effect, plaintiff's counsel need only satisfy his
personal standards as to the application of Rule 11 of the Civil
Rules of Procedure that to the best of his "knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose .... -1
Passing Rule 11 may not meet the ultimate desired effect of
obtaining legal fees and treble damages, not obtainable in an ordinary civil action in a state court where most of these civil RICO
cases really belong, but it does achieve the leverage effect that
most plaintiffs' attorneys really want in civil RICO cases. Not only
do civil RICO plaintiffs obtain the leverage of a treble damages
and attorney fees recovery, but they confront usually legitimate
business with the prospect that the day after the filing of complaint a local newspaper will headline "ABC Corporation and its
President Charged with Racketeering in Federal Court."
d.

What is a "Pattern"?

The short answer is that nobody knows. Nobody knows, even
though the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. ° labored manfully at the
task of educating us. To fully understand the inadequacy of our
current knowledge on this subject, even in the face of H.J. Inc., we
must look first to the text of section 1961. That section, the definitions section, purports to contain in subsection (5) a definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity."'" However, what it says is
" 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date
of this chapter, and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
60. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).

61. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
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prior act of racketeering activity. ' 62 The first obvious problem with
that "definition" was pointed out by Justice White in the famous
footnote 14 of Sedima v. Imrex.63 It is not a definition. As Justice
White put it, "it states that a pattern [of activity] 'requires at least
two acts of racketeering activity,'

. . .

not that it 'means' two such

acts."6 4 As he further stated in the same footnote, "in common
parlance two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern.' ,,15 So
that "pattern" under Sedima required at least two and probably
three acts of "racketeering activity." While the legislative history"
supports a view that a pattern requires not just isolated activity,
but rather a relationship, district courts and the courts of appeal,
even after Sedima, were still floundering as to what "pattern" really means.
Justice Scalia further expanded on the guidance offered by the
Sedima opinion in his separate concurrence in H.J. Inc.:
Four Terms ago, in Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479

(1985), we gave lower courts the following four clues concerning
the meaning of the enigmatic term "pattern of racketeering activity" in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO of the Act), Pub. L. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as
amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 ed. and Supp. V). First,
we stated that the statutory definition of the term in 18 U.S.C. §
1961(5) implies "that while two acts are necessary, they may not
be sufficient." Sedima, 473 U.S., at 496, n. 14. Second, we pointed
out that "two isolated acts of racketeering activity," "sporadic activity," and "proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without
more" would not be enough to constitute a pattern. Ibid. Third,
we quoted a snippet from the legislative history stating "[ilt is
this factor of continuity plus relationshipwhich combines to pro-

duce a pattern." Ibid. Finally, we directed lower courts' attention
to 18 U.S.C. § 3573(e), which defined the term "pattern of conduct which was criminal" used in a different title of the same Act,
and instructed them that "[t]his language
may be useful in inter67
preting other sections of the Act."

Justice Scalia went on to note the degree of helpfulness of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(1970).
67.

Id. (emphasis added).
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added), 714.
Id.
Id.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 91 Stat. 4032
H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2906.
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these four clues to judges laboring on the inferior courts in applying the pattern requirement, "thus enlightened, the district and
circuit courts set out 'to develop a meaningful concept of "pattern,"' [citing Sedima at 500] and promptly produced the widest
and most persistent circuit split on the issue of federal law in recent memory .... -8

To describe for you the width and persistence of that circuit
split, I can do no better than set forth a footnote from the majority
opinion in H.J. Inc. adopted by Justice Scalia in his separate
opinion.
See Roeder v.Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (CA1
1987) (rejecting multiple scheme requirement; sufficient that
predicates relate to one another and threaten to be more than an
isolated occurrence); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,
1381-1384 (CA2 1989) (en banc) (rejecting multiple scheme requirement; two or more interrelated acts with showing of continuity ore threat of continuity sufficient); Barticheck v. Fidelity
Union Bank/First National State, 832 F.2d 36, 39-40 (CA3 1987)
(rejecting multiple scheme requirement; adopting case-by-case
multifactor test); InternationalData Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812
F.2d 149, 154-155 (CA4 1987) (rejecting any mechanical test; single limited scheme insufficient, but a large continuous scheme
should not escape RICO's enhanced penalties); R. A. G. S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (CA5 1985) (two related
predicate acts may be sufficient); United States v. Jennings, 842
F.2d 159, 163 (CA6 1988) (two predicate acts potentially enough);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-976 (CA7 1986)
(refusing to accept multiple scheme requirement as the general
rule; adopting multifactor test, but requiring that predicates constitute "separate transactions"); Sun Savings and Loan Assn. v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (CA9 1987) (rejecting multiple
scheme test; requiring two predicates, separated in time, which
are not isolated events); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925,
928-929 (CAW 1987) (holding single scheme from which no threat
of continuing criminal activity may be inferred insufficient); Bank
of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Touche Ross &
Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (CAll 1986) (rejecting multiple scheme
test; requiring that predicates be interrelated and not isolated
events); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639, 268 U.S. App. D.C. 103, 110, 839 F.2d 782, 789
(1988) (requiring related acts that are not isolated events). 9
68. Id. at 2906-07.
69. Id. at 2898, n.2.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:145

H.J. Inc. repromulgates the four clues from Sedima elevating
them from the footnote status they previously occupied to the
body of the text.7 0 To this, H.J. Inc. adds the helpful suggestion
"that Congress intended to take a flexible approach...,
Beyond that, H.J. Inc. expands on the requirement of "continuity plus relationship," building on the base view that Congress
envisioned "a concept of sufficient breadth that it might encompass multiple predicates within a single scheme that were related
and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued
criminal activity,"7 2 as well as multiple schemes that evidenced the
requisite "continuity plus relationship."
Thus, the Supreme Court had delineated our task of defining
"pattern" largely in terms of defining "continuity" and "relationship." What are they? With all due respect to the Higher Authority that produced H.J. Inc., I suggest that nobody knows that either. As the H.J. Inc. opinion recognizes, it is "difficult to
formulate in the abstract any general test for continuity."7 3 However, in beginning to delineate the requirement, the Court helpfully tells us that " 'continuity' is both a closed and an open ended
concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or
to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a
threat of repetition."7' 4 As to relationship, the Court suggests that
we can borrow that concept from 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) which reflected a pattern requirement, but one requiring only relationship
and not continuity, using the following language: "criminal conduct
forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. '75 That definition was not much
help even before it threw in the word "otherwise." With that addition, it is no help at all.
For a full treatment of the remaining vague, amorphous, undefined and generally unknown meaning of "pattern" in the light of
the Supreme Court's holding in H.J. Inc., I can do no better than
refer you to Justice Scalia's separate opinion. I suggest that any
70. See Id. at 2900.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2901.
74. Id., (citing Barticheck v. Fidelity Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39
(3d Cir. 1987)).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
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lawyer interested in RICO read that separate opinion for its information on this subject and that all other lawyers read it because it
is one of the most entertaining and amusing pieces of legal writing
to appear in any published opinion in recent years. However, after
demonstrating in six short pages (slip opinion pagination) that the
majority's opinion accomplishes effectively nothing at all, Justice
Scalia candidly admits that given the statute with which the Court
is working he would be unable to do any better26 He and the three
Justices joining him then agree with the majority "that nothing in
the statute supports the proposition that predicate acts constituting part of a single scheme (or single episode) can never support a
cause of action under RICO.""
If the other three elements had not sufficiently demonstrated
that RICO is an amorphous mass, "pattern" would, I submit, do so
even if it were coupled with companion elements of pristine clarity
and rigidly walled definition.
B.

The Voraciousness of Civil RICO

The judicial hatred of RICO arises not only from its amorphous mass, but also from the fact that this amorphous mass is a
voracious monster. RICO devours traditional and basic concepts of
American jurisprudence, including: (1) federalism, (2) separation of
powers, (3) First Amendment rights of free speech and association,
(4) labor law, and (5) repose of actions.
1. Federalism
Whatever the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" and
the other language in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964 and 1962 means, certainly
they mean that an awful lot of activity that previously could have
generated at most a state court suit for common law fraud or often
just a breach of contract will today involve a federal court action
labelling a probably legitimate business, union, or association as
racketeers. In addition to hanging the label, those actions will potentially generate, or at least threaten to generate, treble damages
and the award of counsel fees.
As noted in the introduction, Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Sedima expressed grave concerns for the impact of RICO on our
76. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2908.
77. Id. at 2909.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990

17

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:145

bifederal system. 78 As least three of the four Justices of this dissent

are hardly known as rabid champions of States' rights. Yet they
express great concerns about the implication of RICO to our federalism. As Justice Marshall noted,
prior to RICO, no federal statute had expressly provided a private
damages remedy based upon the violation of the mail or wire
fraud statutes, which make it a federal crime to use the mail or
wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud . . . Moreover, the

Courts of Appeals consistently had held that no implied federal
private causes of action accrue to victims of these federal
violations. 9
Thus, the victims found civil relief in State common law fraud actions. This has not been the case since the enactment of RICO and
its discovery by enterprising counsel.
As was also noted in the introduction, Justice Scalia and his
three joining Justices adopt Justice Marshall's concerns in the H.J.
Inc. concurrence. Well might all these Justices express concerns
about the effect of RICO on our federalism. I suggest very strongly
that it is doing violence to the underlying principle of federalism.
The Framers simply did not contemplate in enacting Article III,
creating the federal judiciary, that they were displacing the state
courts from purely local disputes between business competitors,
contracting parties, and other enterprises, let alone arming plaintiffs in such actions with an arsenal of immunized libel and legalized extortion. The legitimacy of this exercise of power by the federal Congress and this use of the federal jurisdiction in
displacement of the states is questionable.
To further understand the degree to which this displacement
from the proper role of the state judiciaries is occurring, it should
be understood that in virtually all of the civil RICO cases that I
have seen and have discussed with federal district judges from
around the country, the principal jurisdictional tag is RICO. Plaintiffs then hang on that jurisdictional peg a variety of state claims
in tort or contract by way of pendant jurisdiction. In Sedima itself,
the underlying action rose out of a contract where a buyer was
ordering parts from the plaintiff.80 Defendant was to obtain the
parts in this country and ship them to Sedima's purchasers in Eu78. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Justice Marshall wrote for himself and Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell).
79. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 484.
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rope."' Plaintiff and defendant were to split the net proceeds8 2
Sedima thought that it had been cheated by inflated bills, under
which defendant was collecting for nonexisting expenses.83 Plaintiff
sued for unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of contract and fiduciary duty, and a constructive trust.8 4 However, since the mails
were the vehicle for transmitting the bills, it alleged two acts of
mailing as mail fraud and brought the RICO claim." While in that
particular case federal jurisdiction probably existed by way of diversity or alienage, the underlying principle is the same. Had these
two corporations been next door to each other, the action would
still have been brought in federal jurisdiction under civil RICO,
dragging in by their tails all the state claims as to which the federal courts should have no part. All the civil RICOs I saw as a
district judge and virtually all of those related to me by my brethren around the country partook of that same nature. They were
essentially common law breach of contract or at most fraud cases
elevated by ingenious pleading into mail fraud cases which then
were the predicates of racketeering activity which then lead to the
invasion of state jurisdiction by the federal courts.
To heighten these concerns of the effect of RICO on federalism, look back to the language of section 1961(1) defining "racketeering activity."8 6 In addition to the incredible compass already
noted above, pay especial attention to (1)(A) which adopts wholesale great areas of State law encompassing "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year."8 "
Thus, I suggest, the voracious RICO monster eats at
federalism.
2. Separation of Powers
I will touch only briefly on what I perceive to be a troubling
effect of RICO on the constitutional doctrine of separation of pow81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
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ers. I know of little case law on this subject, and also note that it is
principally a concern in criminal, not civil RICO, and therefore
technically outside the scope of the present undertaking. Nonetheless, I cannot resist this occasion to note that any criminal statute
requiring construction of as many unbounded terms as RICO, invites, perhaps requires, the Article II Executive in the form of the
prosecutor and the Judiciary in the form of Article III Judges to
undertake the Article I Legislative role of defining federal crimes.
While plaintiffs' attorneys in civil RICO work much mischief by
their definition of civil causes of action, at least they do not define
federal crimes. As to the criminal implications of RICO, I would
echo the concerns expressed by Judge Winter in his dissent from
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-43, before the Supreme Court's at least
temporary rectification of that anomaly in McNalley v. United
States.88 Judge Winter's concern was that "the only restraining influence on the 'inexorable expansion of the mail and wire fraud
statutes' ' ..' . has
discretion. ""

been

the

prudent

use

of

prosecutorial

As you might gather from the citation form, this is a concern
adopted by Justice Marshall in his Sedima dissent.90 While Justice
Marshall directed it specifically, at the incorporation of the mail
and wire fraud statute among the definitional predicates for RICO
violation, I think the concern is a general one, and that
prosecutorial discretion is sufficient to define the whole nature of
federal offense as evidence of an invasion of Article I power by the
Article II Branch, or perhaps an abdication of Article I responsibility in favor of Article II exercise.
3. First Amendment Rights of Free Speech and Association
Sanctity of the rights of expression and expressive association
requires no particular citation of authority. 1 I know of no existing
caselaw dealing with the incursion of judicial power into the expression/association sanctum under RICO, but that does not mean
that the danger does not exist. First, I have heard anecdotally of
88. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
89. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 502 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting in part)).
90. See Id.
91. See generally Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and
authorities collected therein, especially NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1952).
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cases being brought against Right to Life anti-abortion organizations. The popular press has reported that defendants in these civil
RICO actions have included a person or persons whose only involvement was the publication of a newsletter announcing the alleged acts of racketeering by the defendant organizations. Given
the breadth of the associative elements in RICO, if this hasn't occurred, it surely will soon. The danger of a resulting chill is
obvious.
Yellow Bus92 and other civil RICO cases directed at unions already illustrate the potential for the erosion of the associative
rights or at least the full exercise of such rights created by the civil
RICO remedy. 3 Lyng v. International Union UAW 94 recognizes
that the right of union members to associate in and with their
union for the purpose of conducting a strike is a protected exercise
of the freedom of expressive association.9 5 That is precisely what
the union was doing in Yellow Bus.96 Concededly, the allegations of
the plaintiff company included assertions of a "pattern" of violence on the picket line in Yellow Bus.9 7 I do not defend the use of
violence by unions or anyone else, but I do question the legitimacy
of a statutory remedy that includes as an essential element First
Amendment protected association, where the other elements are as
vague, nebulous, and as easily subject to creative allegation as the
elements of civil RICO.
Whether my fears of unconstitutional chill are evidence of
paranoia or realism, only time and continued practice under the
civil RICO statute will tell. Nonetheless, this is a concern shared
by many members of the judiciary and a further reason why we
may join in the Chief Justice's plea to get this monster out of our
courtrooms. 8
4. Labor Law
Once again, Yellow Bus provides the backdrop to another
scene in the drama of the RICO monster eating jurisprudence. As
92. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985); United States v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
94. 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
95. Id. at 1189.
96. Yellow Bus, 839 F.2d at 794.
97. Id. at 789.
98. See supra, note 2.
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my colleague, Judge Harry T. Edwards, wrote in concurring separately in that decision
I have nagging doubts about our holding that "the strike and organizational effort were 'affairs' of Yellow Bus,' . . . and that, consequently, plaintiff might be able to state a cause of action under
§ 1962(c) of RICO. This result seems strangely at odds with certain fundamental precepts of labor law and collective
bargaining. 9
While I do not pretend to equal Judge Edwards' acknowledged
expertise in the area of labor law, I certainly share his pause at
invasion of that well-ordered area of jurisprudence by civil RICO
action. A complex statutory structure governs federal regulation of
labor management relations. More specifically, in reference to Yellow Bus, section 6 of the Norris Laguardia Act governs the liability
of officers or members of labor organizations and of the associations themselves for unlawful acts of individual officers, members,
or agents.'0 0 While Yellow Bus pays lip service to conforming to
the principles of the Norris Laguardia Act,' Congress showed no
evidence in the enactment of RICO that it intended substantially
to rewrite the law of labor-management relations. 0 2 As carefully
balanced as is the structure of federal labor law, I suggest that
Judge Edwards and I, along with other federal judges, share a legitimate concern for the potentially drastic erosion by civil RICO
of yet another whole area of our traditional federal jurisprudence.
5.

Repose of Actions

Finally, RICO does violence to traditional principles of repose
of actions. I do not speak here to the fact that RICO contains no
statute of limitations,'013 nor any statutory provision for determining what statute of limitations governs civil RICO actions.0 This
is not an uncommon omission from federal statutes, and there is
much authority on how the courts should fill this gap. Traditionally, "the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law." ' 5 But, "when a rule from elsewhere in fed99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Yellow Bus, 839 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
839 F.2d at 786.
See generally, 29 A.L.R. FED. 826, 826-834 (1976).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1982).
Id.
Del Costello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983).
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eral law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state
statutes, and when federal policies are at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking,""1 6 the courts have not hesitated
to borrow an appropriate statute of limitations from other federal
sources. This is precisely what the Supreme Court has done with
reference to civil RICO.10 7 In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
and Assoc. the Supreme Court borrowed the four year statute of
limitations from the Clayton Act' 0 8 and applied it to civil RICO,
which in the view of the Court closely tracked the Clayton Act as
to remedial purpose and structure.' 0 9
Nonetheless, this adoption of a specific period of limitations
does nothing to protect fundamental principles relating to the repose actions against RICO erosion. "Statutes of limitations ... represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to
put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of
time and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them.' 11o Limitations of action
"are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long
been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system.""' Though the civil RICO statute is now blessed by judicial
discovery of an applicable statute of limitations, the purpose of requiring plaintiffs to bring their actions within a reasonable time in
order to "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal
with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired
by loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise, ' '- 1 is ill-served by the structure of RICO.
The definition of "pattern of racketeering activity" quoted
above, 1 3 permits the use of "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter
106. Id. at 172.
107. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp v. Malley-Duff and Assoc., 483 U.S. 143
(1987).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
109. 483 U.S. at 152 (1987).

110. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
111. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
112. United States v. Kubrick, at 117.
113. See supra, note 87.
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and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.""' 4 Hypothetically then, a RICO plaintiff could
bring an action as to which his claim had ripened (by injury or
otherwise) within the four year period of limitations. That injury
could have been caused by an act occurring anytime after 1970,
coupled with an act ten years before (or longer if there had been
an intervening imprisonment) and civil RICO would still be
available.
In other words, civil RICO creates an essentially perpetual
cause of action alien to our traditional jurisprudence. Traditionally, our courts have recognized that "even if one has a just claim it
is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the
period of limitations ....,"I1 Congress, of course, has the power to
make determinations as to the period of limitations. Nonetheless,
one must wonder if Congress in the civil RICO statute really made
a conscious decision to create a perpetual cause of action or simply
unwittingly unleashed a monster hungry for a repast of limitations
of actions spiced by all the other traditional concepts of jurisprudence it could eat.
III.
A.

NOTES ON CIVIL

RICO PRACTICE

General Considerations

I recognize that despite the knowledge that you are about to
irritate if not infuriate the Judge in whose court you are planning
to appear, some of the readers of this paper are likely to determine
to file civil RICO cases anyway. Others of you may be defending
civil RICO cases, whether you like it or not. There are certain matters of professionalism and ethical practice that I particularly commend to plaintiffs' attorneys, not because defense attorneys are
unbound by professional and ethical strictures, but because the decision as to whether or not to bring the case is the role of the plaintiff's attorney.
I know that the considerations in favor of couching at least
one count of a complaint in civil RICO terms may be strong ones.
In the first place, as referenced above, RICO provides for treble
114. Id.
115. Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
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damages 1 6 and the recovery of counsel fees 1 7 not normally available in common law fraud, breach of contract, or other state law
claim lawsuits. Additionally, some of you may have decided that
the old adage frequently cited by defense attorneys, asserting questionable counter claims that "he who comes to court without a
claim is automatically suspect," is now amended to add "he who
comes to federal court without a RICO claim is automatically
suspect."
Be that as it may, before you decide to sign a RICO complaint,
I first suggest that you read Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. I am sure that you are familiar with the terms of that
rule, but I would remind you that your signature on a complaint
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."'
Not only the rule, but traditional standards of honest dealing
and professionalism, should require that you are able to make such
a certificate in good faith when you sign the complaint. If your true
motive in couching your complaint in part in RICO terms is to
establish a ground on which you can blackmail a defendant out of
an otherwise undeservedly large settlement by the threat that they
will continue to see themselves written up as "racketeers," then I
suggest that the pleading may have been "interposed for [an] improper purpose such as "to harass." '1 9 In addition to your personal
ethical obligation to live up to this standard, I recognize the ethical
rule that "a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law . . ."20 But I also remind you that "in his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not file a suit, assert a position, con116. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
117. Id.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
119. Id.
120. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
Rule 7.1(A)(1) (1985); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7101(A)(1) (1980).
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duct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or whether it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." '
If ethical considerations and respect for the letter and spirit of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counsel against the filing of a
civil RICO claim, even in an otherwise valid lawsuit, don't do it. In
addition to the ethical propulsion for the decision not to file a civil
RICO claim for purposes of harassment, don't forget the further
provisions of Rule 11 that
if a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the Court, upon motion, or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.122
In other words, an overzealous effort to obtain a fee award for
yourself to the benefit of your client and from the other party
could backfire to the extent of subjecting not only you, but also the
client whose interest you are sworn to represent, to the burden of
bearing the fees of the other side of the lawsuit.
There are, of course, many other considerations to bear in
mind in making the decision as to whether or not to file the case,
to which I will elude in the other notes on practice below.
B.

123
JurisdictionalConsiderations

I have operated throughout this paper on the assumption that
you will bring your civil RICO case in United States district court.
Most plaintiff's attorneys, relying on the language of § 1964(a) to
the effect that "the district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction,"' 2 4 to award injunctive relief, and § 1964(c) that "any
121.

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-

Rule 7.2(A)(1) (1985);

102(A)(1) (1980).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
123. Between the preparation of this article and its publication in final form,
the Supreme Court rendered this subsection largely obsolete by its decision in
Tafflin v. Levitt, 58 U.S.L.W. 4157 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1990) (No. 88-1650). It is now
established that state courts do enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with federal district
courts over civil RICO claims and the reader may happily omit further pursuit of
this portion of the article, unless particularly interested in historical context.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
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person injured in his business or his property by reason of a violation of a § 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court,"' 2 5 bring their actions in United
States district court.
However, the courts are not unanimous on the exclusivity of
this jurisdiction. Some courts have held that state trial courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to hear private actions for damages
under the civil RICO statute.'2 6 Other cases have held that the jurisdiction of the federal district courts is exclusive. 2 7 You will note
that none of these cases were decided either way by a controlling
authority on North Carolina law, and I know of no North Carolina
authority on the subject. You therefore run the risk that should
you bring your RICO case in a North Carolina state court, the
courts of North Carolina will agree with those of New York and
Texas and your RICO case will be out on a dismissal order under
Rule 12(b)(1) s for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
If for tactical reasons you desire to be in state court, I suggest
that you look to Lou v. Belzberg,'2 9 for collected arguments that a
state court does have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts over civil RICO claims. As that case notes, federal law
presumes "that state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
cases arising under federal laws."' 3 0 There are three ways in which
this presumption can be rebutted: (1) by explicit statutory directive; (2) by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or;
(3) by clear incompatibility between federal interests and state
court jurisdiction.' Lou v. Belzberg holds, consequently that you
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
126. See, e.g., County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Morely v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798 (D. Md. 1985); Contemporary Servs.
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Lou v.
Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987); and Jae-soo Yang Kim v. Pereira Enters.,
694 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. La. 1988).
127. See, e.g., Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987); Hampton v.
Long, 686 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. Ind. Co.,
662 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe 643 F. Supp.
584 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, PC, 489
N.Y.S.2d 502, 108 A.D.2d 468 (1985).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
129. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1987).
130. Id. at 735 (citing Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
477-78 (1981)).
131. Id. at 735-36; Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. at 478.
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must argue that none of these three is present.'3 2
If you are defending, and wish to attack the jurisdiction of the
state court, I recommend County of Cook v. Midcon Corp.'3 3 In
that case, the district court noted the parallelism of RICO with the
Clayton Act. 3 4 The court further noted that it has long "been recognized that 15 U.S.C. § 15 gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims."' 3 5 Since the legislative history
indicates that the parallelism between 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 15
U.S.C. § 15 is the result of conscious patterning after the antitrust
prototype, the court reasoned that
Legislators must have known that courts have construed virtually
identical language as giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. It would be anomalous for this court to
hold that the jurisdictional grant in the RICO statute did anything other than create exclusive federal jurisdiction over civil
claims by persons injured by violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.136
It appears that either argument can be made without doing
violence to the obligations of either plaintiffs or defense attorneys
under the ethical standards referenced above, and therefore I expect that you will make them when plaintiff brings a RICO claim
in the North Carolina state court. However, since the question is
unsettled, plaintiffs may wish to bring civil RICO claims in federal
district court.
This does not however mean that there are no jurisdictional
problems to be considered when you bring a civil RICO claim in
federal court. As I mentioned above, the RICO claim is often the
only jurisdictional peg holding in federal court a multi-count complaint setting forth common law or other state claims. Certainly
under the expanded pendent jurisdiction doctrine of United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs'3 7 and its progeny, 38 the federal
court has jurisdiction to decide those non-federal claims. However,
the exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary with the district
132. LOU v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d at 738.
133. 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
134. Id. at 912.

135.
Co., 252
136.
137.
138.
TICE AND

Id. (citing, inter alia Blumenstock Bros. ADV Agency v. Curtis Pub.
U.S. 436 (1920).
Id.
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
See cases collected in 13 B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACPROCEDURE, § 3567.1 (1984).
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judge.1 39 While Gibbs sets forth for the exercise of that discretion,
"considerations of judicial economy,, convenience, and fairness to
the litigants"' 4 0 do not assume that U.S. district courts are going
out of their way to help you bring one more RICO action with its
state spawned hand maidens into their courts.
Remember also that "if the federal claim is too insubstantial
to be the basis for federal jurisdiction, there can be no pendent
jurisdiction of other claims."'
More importantly, "if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in
a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as
well."'' In a number of cases, federal courts have continued to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims, in spite of dismissal
of the federal claim, and in spite of the language from Gibbs.143
However, plaintiffs' counsel should not rely on the possibility that
a U.S. district judge will run very far out on a jurisdictional limb in
order to keep in his court a case that he has already ruled should
not have been brought there in the first place.
While you must weigh all of these jurisdictional considerations
as to whether and where to bring your civil RICO claim, I would
counsel (though reminding you of my interest in the subject) that
if your civil RICO claim is that questionable, you may not wish to
bring it at all. This is particularly true where your state law claims
are strong, since the tenuous possibility of collecting treble damages and counsel fees may well not outweigh the very real possibility of delay, dismissal and subsequent stale evidence or limitations
problems that a more prudent course might have avoided.
C.

The Elements Revisited

Because I have discussed the elements at some length under
the heading of judicial perspective, my further discussion as to
notes on practice will be deliberately abbreviated. However, since
your perspective as practitioners is different than your perspective
as audience to a complaining judge, I will attempt some further
discussion. Various courts have outlined the elements of a civil
139. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
140. Id.
141. 13 B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, 3567.1 (1984); See authorities collected
in n.4.
142. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
143. See, e.g., Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1983); Lentino v. Fringe Emp. Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1979).
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RICO action in various ways. The Supreme Court in Sedima set
forth the following elements: "(1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3)
through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.""14 In addition to
the outlined elements, Sedima treats "injury" as a predicate for
standing, holding that "the plaintiff only has standing if, and can
only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business
or property by the conduct constituting the violation. ' 145 I think a
more useful outline for the practitioner can be drawn from the
careful analysis by U.S. district judge Dale Saffels in Maxwell v.
Southwest National Bank." To paraphrase Judge Saffels analysis, a plaintiff in a civil RICO must prove (1) an injury to his business or property, by reason of a violation of section 1962, as to
which he must prove, (2) "the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or foreign commerce, (3) that the defendant was
employed by or associated with the enterprise, (4) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, and (5)
that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity. 14 7 This outline of the elements is in no way inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's formulation, and does a better job of setting
forth what the plaintiff must really allege and prove.
1. Injury
The injury element is not a particularly demanding one. Prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, various circuits had
sought to require some specific sort of "racketeering injury." For
example, the Second Circuit in the decision reversed by the Supreme Court in Sedima had required the plaintiff to show "injury
caused by [the] kind of harm" that Congress intended to address
in the enactment of the RICO statute. 48 In this formulation, the
Second Circuit referred the congressional intent
to eradicate organized crime because 'organized crime activities in
the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and for144. 473 U.S. at 496 (footnote omitted).
145. Id.
146. 593 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1984).
147. Id. at 256 (quoting Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d
1160 (5th Cir. 1984)).
148. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc, 741 F.2d. 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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eign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine
the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens."' 9
Marshall, in dissent, in the Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit's Sedima decision would have affirmed. While three
other Justices agreed with Marshall, as noted above, five disagreed
and they, of course, stated the law. Under the opinion of the Court
in Sedima, "the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused
by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern
. .-" 150 Thus, the difficulty lies, not with the element of injury, but
only with the element of pattern.
However, Fourth Circuit practitioners should pay particular
attention to the injury element with respect to at least one type of
RICO action. Where the predicate acts consist of violations of SEC
Rule 10(b)(5)"11 prohibiting fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," the Fourth Circuit has delineated
additional restrictions. 152 In International Data Bank Ltd. v.
Zepkin, 15 a post-Sedima decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that
''only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to
bring a private action for Rule 10b-5 violations."' 15 The Fourth
Circuit applies this same limitation to RICO actions founded on
Rule 10b-5 violations as predicate acts and therefore recognizes no
other injury as affording standing to bring such a civil RICO case.
Plaintiff's attorneys would therefore be well advised to use caution
in attempting to bring civil RICO actions predicated on Rule 10b-5
violations. Defense attorneys might also wish to consider whether
the same reasoning might lead to some limitations on civil RICO
actions based on predicate acts violating other specific statutes or
rules.
2. Enterprise
As to the enterprise element, I can add little to what I stated
supra. 115 Happily, I can subtract a little. As I noted there, there is
149. Id. at 495 (quoting from the legislative history of the Act).
150. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
152. See, e.g., International Data Bank Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.
1987).
153. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 152 (relying on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975)).
155. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
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one limiting principle: the enterprise must be distinct from the
RICO defendant. Given the statutory requirement for association,
"logic . . .dictates that one entity may not serve as the enterprise
and the person associated with it because, as Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit has stated, 'you cannot associate with yourself.' "156 The Eleventh Circuit may still constitute a minority of
one to the contrary. 157 The Fourth Circuit does not. 158 Therefore, if
you are attempting to sue, for example, a corporation in a civil
RICO action based on predicate acts committed through individual
officers of the corporation, you might consider making the officers
the defendants and the corporation the enterprise, or you might
otherwise find yourself out of court. Defense attorneys obviously
would be well advised to carefully view civil RICO complaints with
the idea in mind of finding an identity between the enterprise and
the defendant.
Obviously, you should not forget that this statutory element
also requires that the enterprise be one "engaged in or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce."1 59 You must
allege such a "nexus" with interstate commerce and you must be
prepared to prove it, but the required nexus is "minimal."1 6 0 Also,
it is the enterprise that must have the necessary interstate nexus.
It is not necessary that either the defendant,"" or the predicate
acts 6 2 have such a nexus.
3. Employment or Association
Next, the plaintiff must be prepared to allege and prove that
the defendant is a "person employed by or associated with" the
enterprise. 6 3 Not much is required as to this element beyond its
156. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (quoting McCullough v. Sutter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985)).

157. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989-90 (11th Cir. 1982).
158. See generally United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (1982).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982)..
160. See, e.g., R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Conn,
769 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1985).

161. United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d 396 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
828 (1981).
162. Shared Network Technologies, Inc. v. Taylor, 669 F. Supp. 422 (N.D.
Ga. 1987).

163. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
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terms. RICO practitioners should note that the requirement of association and the attendant need for a separation of identity may
be circumvented by alleging § 1962(a) rather than subsection (c)L
Since that section speaks in terms of "any person who has received
any income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity," 6 '
some courts have held that a corporation-enterprise may be held
liable under subsection (a) where the corporation is also a perpe1 65
trator and not merely an instrument as under subsection (c).
But be careful that you allege the proper section and the proper
predicates if you wish to follow this route. Obviously, if you are
defending you should determine whether opposing counsel has
done that, if so you may be able to succeed on motions.
4.

Participationin the Conduct of the Enterprise's Affairs

As I noted in the presentation of the judge's perspective,16 6 the
Fourth Circuit, which encompasses North Carolina, reads the language of section 1962(c) literally, and I think correctly. United
States v. Webster, 6 7 requires proof that the defendant "advanced
or benefitted" the affairs of the enterprise not merely that they
were in some fashion connected." 8 The Fourth Circuit in Webster
rejected the sufficiency of acts of racketeering which were furthered through the enterprise, since the language of the statute requires that the relationship be the reverse of that.6 9 I have no
quarrel with the Fourth Circuit's decision on that point. I suggest
that RICO counsel on both sides remember the requirement, for
formulating complaints, or deciding not to, and for framing motions to dismiss, or for summary judgment.
In Webster, the Fourth Circuit also reiterated the view that
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31
(st Cir. 1986); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,
1398 (9th Cir. 1986); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984).
166. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text. (Section IIa3b)
167. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
168. Id. at 184; but see, Yellow Bus Line v. Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782,
793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 309 (1988). (in which the D.C. Circuit
merely required a "relation between the predicate offenses and the affairs of the
enterprises," so that allegations of acts of racketeering antipathethic to the goals
of the enterprise was deemed sufficient.)
169. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 184 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 435 (1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (1982).
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the enterprise's affairs must be furthered through a racketeering
activity. 170 It is not enough, therefore, that the acts of racketeering
occur, and that furthering of the enterprise occur, the former must
be the means for the latter.17 1 Again, I find this most logical and
commend it to appropriate use by counsel for both sides in RICO
litigation.
5.

Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Again, I can add little to my prior discussion of the pattern
problem supra. 71 I would add further emphasis to a point mentioned in passing in that section. Under the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc., it is now clear that a single scheme can constitute
a pattern, provided it includes multiple acts of racketeering having
the necessary continuity plus relationship.173 So far as what constitutes the predicate acts, I can only recommend that you reread
section 1961(1). During your rereading, remember the caution from
Webster that the conduct of the enterprises affairs must be furthered through the racketeering activity.17 4 With those cautions in
mind, attorneys should be able to determine whether or not a specific fact situation will support proper allegation of a RICO claim,
applying ethical and legal standards.
CONCLUSION

Since Congress has unleashed civil RICO, and does not appear
likely to corral its creature in the near future, and since the prospect that the Supreme Court may do the corralling, while decidedly real, is at best remote in time, judges and lawyers must live
with the beast at large. Therefore, I express, on behalf of myself,
and at least a major part of my colleagues, the hope that you will
ride the beast in a professional manner and only along ethical
trails. While RICO may be expanding into areas never dreamed of
by the Congress, please do not be party to expanding it to the destruction of all traditional concepts of federalism and jurisprudence. If your client has a valid RICO claim, then by all means
bring it. But frame your complaint carefully and according to such
guidance, scant though it may be at times, as the case law pro170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 184-85.
Id.
See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text. (Section II A 3 d)
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
Webster, 639 F.2d at 184.
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vides. If your client does not have a valid RICO claim, be a professional. Don't engage in legalized blackmail. Don't let your desire
for enhanced damages and an award of counsel fees cause you to
sell out your ethical standards. No matter how much you received
in return, the price would be too low. Again, if your client's case is
a sound one, bring it. If it is unsound, don't let the RICO temptations cause you to cloud and perhaps endanger good state law, tort
contract or other common law actions with the fog of jurisdictional
battles and the problems of evidentiary aging that such battles can
cause.
If your client is a defendant in a RICO case, as in any other
case, it is your duty to know the law. Yes, RICO is hard law to
know. But it is your duty to either learn it well enough to represent your client competently or see that he is represented by
someone who can. 7 ' That, of course, is nothing new. It is simply a
new context for the continuing duty of professional counsel.

175. See NORTH CAROLINA BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 and DR 6-101 (1980).
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